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Abstract
Football as Soft Power: The Political Use of Football in Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Vitas Rafael Carosella
Since the early 2000s Gulf state-sponsored investment has entered football. In November 2022 it will reach its zenith when Qatar hosts the first Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup.
This study seeks to understand the use of football as a political tool in Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, through the lens of Joseph Nye’s
theory of soft power. Based on culture, values and policies, soft power is power through attraction as opposed to coercion. The stronger one player’s values, culture and policies are,
the more soft power that player has. Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, traditional fossil
fuel-based states, suffer from a lack of attraction. As the world transitions away from fossil
fuels, the traditional power base of these nations’ wanes. By investing in football, each
nation hopes to project a new image and ensure future relevance. Football is the ideal tool
because it is a universally loved sport, with cross cultural appeal and an established set of
values shared by its participants. By hosting football tournaments and owning and sponsoring clubs, these nations attach their identities to football to appear more attractive.
This work shows that Qatar is using football to increase its standing in the international
community, ensuring its own protection in case of any regional disputes. Meanwhile the
UAE is using football to convert itself into an international travel and business centre,
while Saudi Arabia is investing in football to project a progressive image of itself to the
world and ensure regime security.

Keywords: Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Soft Power,
Soft Disempowerment, Sportswashing, Attraction, Coercion
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Glossary
ADUG: Private Investment Abu Dhabi United Group
AFC: Asian Football Confederation
BeIn Sports: sports broadcasting subsidiary of Al Jazeera, Qatar’s state-run news
network
CFG: City Football Group. Formed in 2008, a branch of ADUG, used to purchase
Manchester City and then create a portfolio of clubs worldwide. These clubs include,
New York City FC, Melbourne City, Girona, Yokohama Marinos, Mumbai City, Montevideo City Torque, Sichuan Jiuniu, Lommel SK and Esperance Sportive Troyes Aube
Champagne.
CONMEBOL: Confederación Sudamericana de Futbol, South American football
governing body
FA: Football Association of England
FIFA: Federation Internationale de Football Association, world governing body
of football
GCC: International Olympic Committee
IOC: International Olympic Committee
MENA: Middle East and North Africa
MBS: Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and de facto ruler.
PIF: Public Investment Fund of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, used to purchase
Newcastle United.
PSG: Paris Saint Germain, Parisian football club owned by Qatar.
QIA: Qatar Investment Authority
QSI: Qatar Sports Investment, subsidiary of QIA, used to purchase PSG.
SAFF: Saudi Arabia Football Federation
UAE: United Arab Emirates
UEFA: Union of European Football Associations, European football governing body
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Introduction
After the British Empire captured the Suez Canal in 1882, football was introduced to the
Middle East and North Africa. First restricted to Europeans, in time the educated Egyptian
community was allowed to play as the game ‘introduced them to Western culture and provided lessons on morality, unity, discipline and authority’ (Raab, 2013). Football eventually
became the most popular sport in the region.1 Nowadays it is a source of national pride,
and political influence, especially given the amount of money invested in the game by three
Gulf states.
On 20 November 2022, Qatar will start hosting the twenty-second FIFA World Cup, the
first in the Middle East. The tournament will be the culmination of a long-term soft power
political sporting strategy which has raised the level of international political and media attention on Qatar. Its powerful neighbours, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have
also invested heavily in football as they compete with Qatar for regional socioeconomic and
political supremacy.
Sports have always been political. Coakley (2008) posits that sport is subject to the laws
of the state and is a social and cultural institution with transnational impact. However,
the study of the nexus of sport and politics in International Relations did not truly begin
until the 1980s. The first notable work produced was Approaches to the Study of Sport in
International Relations by Kyrolainen and Varis in 1981 (Coakley, 2008). Until recently,
from a scholarly perspective there has been a perceived lack of importance in the subject of
sport, but, in fact, sport has been a political tool for decades, if not centuries. Hough (2008)
argues football has been a tool of rapprochement, peacekeeping – like the 2008 football
détente between Armenia and Turkey – and nation-building. Kobiercki (2013) notes that
sports have been used to establish national superiority – the 1936 Olympics – and gain international recognition.
Today the football landscape is changing. Clubs once ingrained in the fabric of the community are morphing into international entities with extreme financial and cultural power.
Likewise, events such as the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Champions League are increasingly consequential due to their economic and cultural appeal.2 Qatar, the UAE and Saudi
1

This was controversial. Imams claimed football distracted from Islam. The Grand Mufti of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia even claimed ‘the nature of the game sparks fanatical partisanship, trouble and the emergence
of hate and malice.’ (Goldblatt, 2019)
2
The first week of the 2014 FIFA World Cup saw a greater number of Facebook interactions than the 2014
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Arabia recognise the opportunities that football’s popularity provides and have chosen to
exploit them to increase their international standing.

Football and Politics
Sport and politics are increasingly studied in unison. Works such as Dichter and Johns’
(2020) and Coakley (2008) have helped explain the political use of sport. Like most other
works, both focus primarily on Cold War Era events and the Olympic Games. Long overdue is an adjustment of the research scope, with a broader understanding of how sport is
used for political means. It is necessary to examine individual sports, events, time periods
and geographic locations to get a global perspective of how intertwined sport and politics
truly are.
Football generates the most money,3 and is the most accessible sport worldwide. Given
its international appeal, football has the unique ability to mix massive markets with fan
popularity, while simultaneously gathering the attention of politicians, investors and fans
(Trillas, 2018). This popularity is now being capitalised upon by Qatar, the UAE and Saudi
Arabia, who are using football’s global reach to create new identities.
With the first MENA World Cup about to kick off, this paper should serve as a timely
study of football as a soft power diplomacy tool on the eve of the greatest sporting event
the MENA region has ever hosted. The purpose of this work is to address the political motivations behind Qatar, the UAE and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s use of football as a soft
power diplomacy tool.
What goals are they trying to achieve, and why is football the tool of choice?
It is the author’s contention that these nations are using football to elevate their standing
in the world. Qatar seeks to ensure its long-term security and relevance, while diversifying
away from natural gas. The UAE focuses its football-related spending on attracting foreign
business and converting the nation into a business and transport hub. Saudi Arabia enters
the football market seeking to modernise its image and retreat from oil-based revenues. The
attention and attraction football investment can generate is priceless for these Gulf states.

Super Bowl, Winter Olympics and Academy Awards combined (Goldblatt, 2019).
3
The European Football Market generated €25.2 billion in the 2019-20 season, while American Football
generated roughly €13 billion. The difference, around €12 billion, does not account for non-European
leagues and markets, nor does it factor in summer tournaments such as the FIFA World Cup (Gough, 2021
and Lange, 2021).

–7–

As a small state, Qatar fears threats to its national sovereignty, like the blockade imposed
in 2017 by Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain. Qatar’s soft power football strategy aims to amplify its standing in the world by raising its national profile as a global sporting hub. Hosting
sports mega-events and investing in European club football increases Qatar’s international
recognition. Qatar is betting that its augmented international standing will deter potential
coercive actions neighbouring states may be contemplating.
The UAE have opted for a football security strategy based around business. While the
Emirates have hosted smaller tournaments, like the FIFA Club World Cup,4 they are focused on football sponsorship opportunities and creating a diverse business portfolio. The
use of Etihad and Emirates airlines as sponsors for major football clubs, and the development of the City Football Group, have made Dubai and Abu Dhabi synonymous with success, modernity and forward-thinking business.
Despite being the most successful of the three nations on the football field, Saudi Arabia
is the relative newcomer to the political football world. In 2016, Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Salman (MBS) launched Vision 2030, a plan emphasising modernisation and seeking
to appeal to western investment, while decreasing oil dependency. The Vision included the
use of sport as an attractive force, but was quickly undermined due to backlash from the
murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. In response, MBS pushed more progressive reforms,
such as allowing women to drive and go out without male companions. In 2019, the Saudi
Arabia Football Federation (SAFF) even launched the Department of Women’s Football
Development (FIFA, 2022).
The culmination of increased Saudi investment in football has been the purchase of Newcastle United. The historic club in northern England is now a pawn in a political game,
like the Abu Dhabi-owned Manchester City and Qatari-owned Paris Saint Germain (PSG).
It is hoped that each of these clubs will reflect some of their glamour on to their Middle
Eastern owners.
The political motives for using the beautiful game are evident. All three nations have
cause for concern and have sought non-traditional remedies to their problems. The world’s
most popular sport is an attractive tool by which these nations can create new economic,
social and political ties with critical international players. The hope is that these ties will
4

The FIFA Club World Cup, previously the Intercontinental Cup, is a tournament in which the club champions of each footballing confederation face each other. Unlike the FIFA World Cup – in which national teams
compete - this tournament is less of a draw for fans and is often won by the financially dominant European
clubs.
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bring economic growth, enhanced reputation and security and hitherto unknown political
power to these Gulf states.
Initial backlash to these football projects is pertinent. However, further research is required to study the implementation and success of the soft power football strategies. Despite
the author’s desire to delve fully into these issues, they lie outside the scope of the present
study. Moreover, the question of these projects’ success is ongoing, as the strategies of all
three nations are still under way. Therefore, no final conclusions can be made at this point.

Methodology and Sources
The hypotheses in this paper stem from the use of qualitative research and persistent observation of the football world. The sources used are diverse. They aim to provide context and
a deeper understanding of the football world to tease out the motives behind each nation’s
use of the sport.
The study grounds itself in the work of renowned International Relations scholar Joseph
S. Nye. Three of his articles discussing his seminal theory of soft power will be unpacked.
By clarifying the definition of soft power and discussing some of its uses and criticisms, the
theoretical underpinnings of the study are set.
Each state is studied individually and considered in its proper context. Critical sources
which contributed to the study of the Gulf nations’ use of football were the pioneering books
of Goldblatt (2019), Dorsey (2016) and Montague (2017). Primary sources from each state
were also consulted, with focus placed on the Qatar and Saudi 2030 Vision projects and
The UAE Soft Power Strategy. Press releases from the UN, FIFA and human rights groups
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were critical in understanding the international community’s response to these football initiatives and are evidence of the kind of
unwanted attention generated by state-sponsored investment in football.
Despite Gulf investment in football becoming mainstream news in recent years, there
remains limited scholarship on the link between sports and international relations. Regardless, primary sources were supported by available scholarly articles from experts on football
or MENA affairs. Essential authors for this project included Ulrichsen (2016), Grix and
Lee (2013), Farred (2016), Hough (2008) and Brannagan and Giulianotti (2015). To keep
the study current, prominent news outlets such as The Guardian, Deutsche Welle and The
Athletic were also consulted. They provided extensive coverage on the World Cup’s human
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rights issues, relations between each of these states and their associated football club(s), the
purchase of Newcastle United and sportswashing.
Sportswashing is a relatively new term which refers to reputation laundering through
sport. The premise is that by investing in sport a nation-state, company or individual can
alter their public perception for the better. In this study, sportwashing will refer to Qatar,
the UAE and specifically Saudi Arabia’s concerted investments in football to project modern images while covering up less savoury aspects of their reputations.
The academic texts consulted used qualitative studies, including interviews with people
involved in the game, studies of historical events and long-term analysis of political trends
in the MENA region to understand current Gulf investment in the beautiful game. The core
debates drawn from these works were varied. One of the most prominent debates dealt with
the use of Sports Mega- Events as one-off opportunities for state-branding, power expansion and increased attraction.
This debate proved useful in the context of the upcoming World Cup. Likewise, the concept of soft-disempowerment ran through several articles. When sports branding or events
go wrong, they open the door to disaster, as the scandal around the FIFA World Cup bidding process did for Qatar. Other debates which surfaced were the use of sports to enact
social change, sports as an alternative form of nationalistic expression to war, the in-vogue
concept of sportswashing and of course the effect of intangible soft power resources like
culture, values and ideology which can easily be perpetuated through football.
Each debate helped lay a portion of the foundation for this study. By looking at these
three nations’ involvement in football this study looks past the single sporting event to the
general politicisation of sport. It focuses on football’s capacity to increase the relevance and
attraction of these three non-Western nations, and each state’s motivation for using it.

The Definition of Soft Power
As the Cold War drew to a close in the early 1990s, Harvard Associate Dean for International Affairs, Joseph S. Nye, authored his first article about his new theory of soft power.
He stated that power ‘is an ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what
they otherwise would not,’ (1990, p.154). He further expanded on the topic by qualifying it
as ‘the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather
than coercion’ (Nye, 2008, p.94).
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Traditionally, control stemmed from hard power, made up of elements such as natural resources, population, territory, economic output, military might and political stability
(Nye, 1990). The fall of the Soviet Union changed a bipolar world temporarily to a unipolar one, eventually giving way to multipolarity. Simultaneously, economic and political interconnectedness increased. Nye understood that international power dynamics no longer
revolved solely around hard power and postulated a power unreliant on economic inducement or coercion, but rather on co-optation.5
Soft power is founded on three key resources: culture, political values and foreign policies. A soft power player (sometimes also referred to as an actor) is only attractive if their
culture pleases others, their values are consistently practised and their policies seen as inclusive and legitimate.6 Culture, as described by Nye, is ‘a set of practices that create meaning for a society,’ (2008, p.96). Culture extends to mass entertainment, including sports,
film and the arts, and it is through the effective sale of culture that soft power grows.
Public diplomacy is an integral part of an effective soft power strategy. Public broadcasts,
international exchanges, subsidies of cultural exports and assistance programs all attempt
to draw attention to the culture, values and policies of the soft power player. Nye postulated
(2008, p.101) that ‘the effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured in minds changed, not
money spent.’ To change minds, practising what you preach and credibility are key. But in
a world where information is nearly unlimited and attention is scarce, using a tool which
amplifies publicity and recognition can make all the difference.
Football is the ultimate tool. It ‘constitutes a worldwide known sport that is able to project the image of companies around the world using transnational values which are able to
be shared within different communities and cultures’ (Ginesta, 2013, p.77).

Criticisms
Nye’s theory of soft power has detractors. Todd Hall (Felsch, 2016) questions soft power’s
validity, stating that attraction is not a suitable analytical tool. True, soft power is more

5

Co-optation refers to power subsumed through shared attractive policies, values and culture. In the
context of this study, the Gulf nations aim to co-opt power and legitimacy by portraying an appropriation
of Western values and culture through football. If the other states believe Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE
uphold said policies and values, their international legitimacy increases as does their power. Football is
therefore, their conduit of soft power.
6
According to Nye (2009), a lack of inclusivity and legitimacy help explain a decrease in US popularity. The
US preaches democracy and freedom, but has often waged wars under the banner of democracy and nation
building.
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difficult to assess than hard power.7 Furthermore, soft power poses two other issues: it
frequently involves other, non-governmental players, and it appeals to the individual (Seymour, 2020).
Realists believe that the main players of geopolitics are nation-states. To accept a theory
which sees states and non-state players as equal competitors is an affront to their understanding of international relations. Therefore, they often refute the theory. But FIFA, like
Hollywood and McDonalds, is a player whose product is so attractive, its influence is global.
Humans are complex: different beliefs, customs, values and identities make appealing to
them a challenge for public diplomacy. However, as studies have proven, some phenomena create cross- cultural appeal. Football is one of these. As Ginesta (2013, p.70) explains,
‘Being linked to sports brands and events allows companies and entities to share values and
overcome language and cultural barriers.’
Soft power yields results slowly, gradually convincing individuals in different societies
of its purpose. Polling data, interviews and other measurement techniques can assess the
influence of soft power on communities, nation-states and other players.8 While it may
not be holistic, this approach can grab other players’ attention, change narratives, shape
preferences and set examples, all increasing a player’s legitimacy. Admittedly, this may not
always work. Soft disempowerment (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015) occurs when the
player attempting to attract, instead upsets or offends and therefore loses attractiveness
and influence altogether. This phenomenon can undercut even the most well-thought-out
soft power strategies. But as Nye (2009, p.161) posits, ‘Even if soft power is rarely sufficient,
it can help create an enabling or disabling context for policy.’

How Soft Power Relates to the Gulf States
Xavier Ginesta may have been talking about companies when he wrote that football can
help project an image and reach different communities and cultures, but the same applies
to nation- states. Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia all seek greater footing on the global
stage. None has enough hard power resources to reach the heights they strive for; they
7

Seymour (2020) points out that a battle assessment can be done almost instantaneously, but the cultural
understanding gained during a Fulbright exchange may take years to comprehend. Check softpower30.com
for an extensive soft power assessment of nation-states.
8
The Anholt-Gfk Roper Survey in 2011 showed that tourism, media, food and German film consumption
all increased after the 2006 FIFA World Cup. Likewise, research shows that hosting a lackluster event can
harm reputation and limit attraction. The Athens 2004 Olympics and the 2010 Indian Commonwealth
Games are examples of this (Grix and Houlihan, 2013).
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therefore rely upon foreign trade and military deals to maintain their authority and legitimacy in international politics.
Much of Qatar’s credibility in international politics stems from its relationship with the
US. They host the longest-standing US military base in the region and have recently agreed
to represent US interests in Afghanistan, essentially becoming the US-Taliban go-between
(Landay and Pamuk, 2021). The UAE’s international legitimacy stems from its more than
twenty tax free zones (Bruns, 2017), which have allowed international business to flourish.
Saudi Arabia relies upon arms deals with the US and UK for security. Mecca and Medina give
Saudi Arabia cultural and religious influence. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has at times sought
to ensure regional stability, backing institutions such as the IMF (International Monetary
Fund) and the Arab League, and even supporting the formation of an Arab Customs Union
and a Common Market (Gallarotti and Al-Filali, 2012). Yet, until recently, all three states
have generated limited attraction – through their cultures, policies and values – beyond,
and at times within, the Muslim world.
These predominantly Muslim nations do not resonate culturally with the West or East
Asia. Strict interpretations of the Qur’an and Shariah-based law often scare away foreigners. They are also strictly authoritarian, limiting all types of free speech and repressing
women’s freedoms. Additionally, they suffer from post-colonial orientalist stigma, which
stereotypes them as uncivilised, exotic, inferior and having opposing values to their Western counterparts (Griffin, 2019).
Football can be the great equalizer in this regard. As Grix and Lee (2013) state, ‘They
can show the world they are guardians of universal norms and can construct attraction by
illuminating truths such as fair play that have universal appeal.’

Qatar
Political History
Formed in 1971, Qatar is an Islamic constitutional emirate ruled by the Al Thani family with
a population of roughly 2.5 million people, only 12% of whom are Qatari citizens (Britannica, n.d.; Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015). Originally intended to be the eighth emirate
of the UAE and seen as a vassal by the House of Saud, Qatar’s existence has always been
contentious. The once poor pearl diving protectorate has become the world’s principal sup-
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plier of liquefied natural gas. Now, Qatar is using its vast wealth9 to develop into a modern
state, with football helping to generate international goodwill and ideally long-term security. However, as Qatar prepares for the 2022 World Cup, human rights and corruption
issues within the country have drawn heavy criticism, significantly counteracting all these
efforts. In addition, Qatar’s investment in the beautiful game has increased the longstanding friction with its neighbours.

Vision 2030 and the Move towards Modernisation
In 2008, Qatar mapped out its future. Understanding that international appeal would help
ensure sovereignty and security, and that economic and social progress were paramount in
garnering such appeal, its rulers consulted experts to create Qatar National Vision 2030.
The Vision provided a framework to transform Qatar into an advanced, self-sustaining nation and explicitly planned Qatar’s increased role in regional economic, political and cultural affairs.
To carry out the Vision, Qatar drafted two National Development Strategies (NDS). NDS
1 stressed the importance of hosting events and developing first-class sporting facilities,
which would prove a powerful tool for international engagement and diplomacy, encouraging tourism and trade (General Secretariat, 2008). In 2018, NDS 2 emphasised promoting
sports within the country, building them into the culture and establishing a national identity. By developing excellence in sports, Qatar would be appreciated as a central hub for
cultural exchange (Ministry of Development, 2018).
Vision 2030 also seeks to protect the Qatari identity while coexisting with global values
(Griffin, 2019). Various reforms to please the international community show this, including
electronic wage transfers, a new minimum wage and the beginning of the end of the Kafala
system; a legal framework that gives companies and private citizens complete control over
migrant labourers and their immigrations status, and one which has long been derided as a
violation of human rights and equated to modern day slavery (Robinson, 2021) 10
9

According to the IMF Qatari GDP per capita stood at roughly US$64,770 at the end of 2021. The total GDP
stood at roughly US$169 billion in 2021 and is projected to reach US$214 billion by 2026. Fitch Solutions
predicts Qatari GDP to increase 3.2% annually between 2022 and 2030 (Owen, 2021). The state’s sovereign
wealth fund stands at £300 billion (Slater, 2019).
10
According to the International Labour Organisation (2021), Qatar is the first state in the MENA region to
introduce a non-discriminatory minimum wage. Current reforms include a minimum wage of 1000 QAR,
300 QAR for food and a stipend for housing if it is not provided by employers. The ILO reports that compliance with the new system will be checked and violations will be penalised. They also expect the Kafala
system and No Objection Certificates to be eliminated.
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Football is being reformed too. The implementation of a women’s national team in 2010
and a female domestic league in 2012 were huge developments. The normalisation of female sport in Qatar was a first in the region, broadcasting its progressive views to the outside world.
Qatar’s Vision 2030 is a modernisation strategy to ensure the backing of the international community in case of any emergency, like the invasion of Kuwait in the 1990s (Dorsey,
2016). The Vision plan encompasses soft power, hard power and inducements. ‘Political
mediation, its world-class airline and position as an international transport hub, its US military base, its prominent news network – Al-Jazeera, sponsorship of the arts, world-class
museums and investment in real estate and bay-front assets all play a role in their strategy’
(Dorsey, Nov 2021). Football, however, has become a critical element in the Qatari vision
for a modern, self- sustaining state.

The 2022 FIFA World Cup and Relations with Other Gulf Nations
Although diplomatic relations were recently restored through the Al-Ula declaration, Qatar’s relationship with its neighbours has been unstable for years. Saudi Arabia and the
UAE both took issue with Qatar’s backing of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Iran and
more recently the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Saudi-Arabian-backed coalition considered
this backing an attempt to subvert the status quo in the region.11
As one of the smaller Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, Qatar has often been seen
as an insignificant player in the region. However, it was Qatar who first devised a soft-power
football strategy, created state-of-the-art facilities and won the 2022 World Cup bid. Griffin
(2019) posits that the World Cup has become a source of tension between, specifically, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has tried to persuade FIFA that 2022 World Cup hosting
duties should be shared amongst the Gulf nations. This was reflected in a speech made by
FIFA President Gianni Infantino (2018), when he mentioned the idea of World Cup games
being played in ‘Qatar and other countries in the Arabian Gulf.’ Despite Saudi Arabia’s attempts to interfere, the tournament is going ahead as planned.

11

Relations between Qatar and the Saudi-led coalition (UAE, Bahrain and Egypt) hit their lowest point in
2017 when the coalition severed ties with Qatar. Qatari goods were boycotted, ships banned and BeIn Sports
was pirated by Saudi Arabian-backed BeOutQ. The pirating cost Qatar millions of dollars and resulted in an
international lawsuit.
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The Saudis understand that by winning the hosting bid, Qatar has earned the world’s
focus for over ten years.12 Hosting an event of this magnitude cannot be underestimated; it
is a ‘relatively cheap13 means of improving a nation’s image, credibility, stature, economic
competitiveness and (they hope) ability to exercise agency on the international stage’ (Grix
and Lee, 2013, p.522).

PSG, BeIN Sports and Aspire Academy
The World Cup is the pinnacle for Qatar, but serious state investment in football began at
the turn of the century. In 2004, Qatar opened Aspire Academy in Doha, a state-of-theart multisport training complex, later opening fifteen more Aspire facilities worldwide.14
Aspire played host to a US$15 million global tryout for several years running. The prize, a
chance for young football players to earn a permanent spot in the academies and have a better life (Dorsey, 2016). As one of the world’s best facilities, Aspire has facilitated long-term
relationships between Qatar, prominent football clubs15 and thousands of talented young
players from diverse backgrounds.
In 2011 Qatar Sports Investment (QSI) authorised the purchase of the French club Paris
Saint Germain (PSG). PSG was not a super club, but as the only major club in the city, it offered the new owners the brilliance of Paris and a large fanbase. QSI began constructing the
club into a global brand. They followed Real Madrid’s example, signing stars like Beckham,
Ibrahimović, Mbappé and Neymar. PSG introduced a new logo, new marketing techniques
and a new CEO; Nasser Al Khelaifi (Chanavat, 2017).16 Within two years, the club signed
12

The Saudis are eager to earn the same international attention. Their unsuccessful attempt to hijack Qatar’s World Cup has given way to their own bid to host the World Cup in 2030. This will be the centenary
tournament, marking 100 years since the original tournament, which will only draw more attention, and
Saudi Arabia hopes to capitalise on that.
13
Estimates show costs of the 2022 FIFA World Cup will add up to roughly US$250 billion (Ellwood, 2020).
However, the World Cup is a one-off investment which helps create new infrastructure, generates investment and foreign interest and improves the national image.
14
Six of these fifteen facilities were in nations on FIFA’s Executive Committee due to vote on the 2010
World Cup bids (Montague, 2017).
15
FC Barcelona, FC Bayern Munich and AS Roma have all been sponsored by Qatar Airways in recent years.
Bayern have attended winter training camps at Aspire since 2011, and despite criticism from their own fans,
Bayern claim Qatari sponsorship is vital to compete at the highest level of football. Their former CEO acknowledged the criticisms of Qatar, but claimed dialogue, not criticism was the only way to improve things
(Ford, 2021).
16
Khelaifi has curated an image of Qatari excellence. He is the CEO of PSG, the chairman of QSI, was the
chairman of BeIn Sports and is the head of the European Club Association. He even won an award as most
influential person in football, beating out Messi, Ronaldo and the FIFA president (Uddin, 2020). He is such
a power broker in European football, that any potential sanction for his threats towards Dutch referee Danny Makkelie after PSG’s exit from the Champions League last season have been swept under the rug (Panja,
2022).
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a €200 million per year sponsorship with the Qatar Tourism Authority. This ensured that
every jersey had the nation’s name on it, fusing Qatar’s identity with PSG.
Despite initial investigations from UEFA over PSG’s spending, the Qatari ownership of
the club has proved lucrative. PSG has won all but two league titles since 2012 and reached
the Champions League final in 2019-20. One year prior they became the fifth most lucrative
football brand in the world, surpassing Abu Dhabi-owned Manchester City. Sponsorships
with Air Jordan and Accor International were announced and merchandise stores were
opened in Japan. PSG has become a marketing machine for Qatar, linking success on the
field to Doha and the gas fields beyond it (Murphy, 2021). And 16 months before the start of
their World Cup, despite the Saudi- led boycott, PSG signed seven-time Balon d’Or winner
Lionel Messi (Uddin, Aug 2021).17
Seeking to become the sports capital of the world, Qatar is spending more per capita on
football than any other nation (Murphy, 2021).
The final piece of the Qatari football puzzle is BeIn Sports, vital to Qatar spreading its
influence worldwide. BeIn broadcasts globally, including in US and Asian markets. In the
MENA region and vast portions of Asia, they have the rights to the major European domestic leagues as well as the 2018 World Cup and their own (Dorsey, 2016).
Qatar’s co-optation of football is an investment in a new future for the nation. As Dorsey
(2016, p.2) posits:
‘Qatar has led the other Gulf states in spending massively to position itself as a
global hub punching above its weight, increasing its diplomatic and economic
influence and employing soft power to embed itself in the international community and to enhance its security, branding and access.’

Backlash
The FIFA World Cup provides Qatar the opportunity to display its unique characteristics
and signals its capacity to host events on a par with any developed nation (Griffin, 2019).
However, Qatar’s involvement in football has drawn serious criticism, to which Qatar initially did not respond. As criticism mounted, so did the potential for soft disempowerment
17

The contract signed was worth reportedly €25 million net per season, however, QSI believe that the
commercial benefit outweighs the cost, and they intend to use Messi’s image in a PSG shirt to promote their
World Cup (Crafton, Aug 2021).
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(Dorsey, 2016). Thus, Qatar implemented reforms and claimed that football would be the
kick-starter for social change in the Gulf. But much of the damage has already been done.
human rights

- Amnesty International’s (2021) report, Qatar, One Year Out, con-

cludes that the labour reforms, highly touted by Qatar and FIFA are not being implemented
effectively. The Kafala System and exit permits restricting a worker’s ability to switch jobs
or leave the country are still in effect. Many workers go unpaid or receive payments late
and working conditions have been described as inhumane, with workers labouring in 48C
heat (Neville in Qatar, 2019). Consequently, The Guardian in 2021 reported that 6,500
migrant workers have died in Qatar, while ZDF Sportsudio (2021) recently reported a total
of around 15,000.
On September 15th, 2022 Amnesty International released the results of a global poll they
commissioned regarding the upcoming World Cup. Two conclusions can be drawn from
the poll: 1) there is still great interest in watching this year’s tournament, 2) there is demand from fans for FIFA and national football associations to speak out about the human
rights issues in occurring in Qatar. The poll surveyed people from both the global north and
south, and over 50% of those asked said they would watch at least one game of this World
Cup. However, nearly three quarters of all interviewees stated they would like to see FIFA
compensate World Cup workers for the injustices they have suffered. This poll shows both
backlash to and interest in the tournament, the dichotomy of sport in a nutshell.

The Results of the Amnesty International Poll
(Amnesty International,
2022)
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world cup bid

– the bidding process was marred by unprecedented levels of corrup-

tion, spawning several criminal investigations. Qatar even used a former CIA operative,
Kevin Chalker, to spy on the FIFA officials selecting the winner and ensure their bid’s victory (Suderman, 2021).

Nick Harris’ list profiling the World Cup Executive Voting Committee (Nick Harris, 2021)
lack of infrastructure – Harris (2021) cites that Qatar is seeking to attract roughly

1.2 million visitors for the World Cup. However, total rooms in Qatari hotels and apartments currently stand at 130,000. This may lead fans to take drastic measures: flying in and
out of Qatar on the same day, camping in the desert or even staying in ‘nearby cities’ such
as Riyadh, Dubai and Abu Dhabi.
cosy relationship with fa

– Documents obtained by The Athletic (Crafton, 2021)

reveal a close relationship between the English FA and the Qatari government. Qatar purchased £6 billion worth of Typhoon fighter jets and in return, the FA is showing full support
for the 2022 World Cup, and the reforms being made in the Gulf nation.
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civil liberties – The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner investigated

Qatar in 2019 about arbitrary detention and suppression of civil liberties. Despite the lack
of full cooperation by the Qatari authorities, the UN (2019) gathered enough information
for them to determine that fair trials were rare, adultery laws unfairly targeted women and
freedom of speech was criminalised. The case of Jordanian national Abdullah Ibais, who
worked for the Qatari state’s Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy of the World
Cup, is a prominent example of restricted civil liberties. He was arrested and tried without
due process after expressing concerns about how a workers’ strike was handled by the committee (Melnaes, 2021).
lgbtq+ community

– The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs has given assurances

that all people, including those of LGBTQ+ distinction, will be welcome at the tournament.
However, homosexuality is illegal in Qatar, and as such many LGBTQ+ fans say they will
not go to Qatar. Despite that, LGBTQ+ fans ability to love whom they choose will be defended by the OneLove campaign initiated by the Dutch national team. Their captain and
the captains of seven other nations will wear rainbow armbands at the tournament to show
their support for love in all forms and as a gesture of opposition to discrimination (NOS
Voetbal, 2022).
These concerns portray the soft disempowerment Farred (2016) describes as the autoimmunity of sports mega-events. The host invites praise and disaster in equal measure as
it opens its doors to the outside world. For some fans, Qatar’s human rights abuses and inconsistent values and policy render the World Cup unwatchable.18 Yet, the 2018 World Cup
provided enough distraction to cause people to forget the controversial politics surrounding
Russia. The same is occurring in Qatar. Official figures show over 2.9 million tickets have
already been sold for the tournament, with heavy demand for tickets coming from the US,
the UK, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Brazil and Argentina (TyC Sports, 2022).
Despite its authoritarian nature, its attempts to repress free speech and the obvious issues surrounding workers’ rights, there is enough political will from within FIFA, Qatar
and from major sponsors for the tournament to go ahead. FIFA and the ITUC see a strong
positive shift in labour laws and progressive measures being taken in Qatar.
18

Qatar was supportive of the Arab Spring, preferring a change of the status quo. It used Al Jazeera to encourage debate about the uprisings, yet, it remains a highly authoritarian state. President Obama noted the
contradiction, saying that Qatar was a booster of democracy but was failing to reform its own state (Dorsey,
p.259). Qatar also relies heavily on economic power. Like the UAE, it builds relationships on financial incentives and humanitarian aid. These elements undercut strict interpretations of Nye’s soft power resources.
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Furthermore, in both political and sporting circles Qatar has a positive image, associated with stars, success international diplomacy and the glamorous side of football. This is
telling.

The UAE
Political History
The United Arab Emirates – or commonly the UAE, a nation of seven constituent emirates
– gained independence from Great Britain in 1971.19 Historically dominated by fractured
fishing tribes, the Emirates is now an elective monarchy with the seventh-largest oil reserve
in the world and a founding member of the GCC. The Emirates’ quantity of oil, its location
and its moderate Islam compared to neighbour Saudi Arabia, have made it an appealing
trade partner, despite its authoritarian government. The UAE is a long-time ally of Saudi
Arabia. Former leader Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan emphasised in 1972 that the
Emirates wished to have the same attitude and direction as Saudi Arabia (Ulrichsen, 2021).
Despite its alliances and oil profits, the UAE is looking to diversify its revenue streams
and rely less on its allies.20 Since 2004, the UAE has taken a more aggressive stance in the
region, engaging in both soft and hard power politics. It has launched a soft power strategy,
while at the same time bombing Yemen and backing the blockade of Qatar as part of the
Saudi-led coalition (Ulrichsen, 2017). The government’s goal is to increase state power,
push towards modernisation and steer away from an oil-based economy. Football is a tool
of modernisation that attracts tourism and foreign investment to the Emirates.

Soft Power Plans
Unlike Qatar, the UAE has been a political contradiction since the Arab Spring. Its involvement in Yemen, its backing of the military in Libya and its support for the Egyptian coup
has caused the Emirates to lose international support but gain regional security. The Emirati soft power strategy of nation branding through football aims to combat the negativity
surrounding its military interventions and human rights abuses.

19

Each emirate has its own limited autonomy. Abu Dhabi joining OPEC in 1967, four years before the entire
UAE joined, shows the individual authority of each emirate (Ulrichsen, 2017).
20
In the 1990s, the Emirates established a military relationship with the US, securing US protection against
a potential Iraqi attack. In 1994 the Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed making the Al-Dhafra base
in Abu Dhabi a vital US military base in the region.
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To curry international favour, the UAE established progressive development plans. Its
Soft Power Strategy (UAE Soft Power Council 2017) aims ‘to increase the country’s global
reputation abroad by highlighting its identity, heritage, culture and the contributions of the
UAE to the world.’ The Emirates would like to make itself a gateway to the world and establish a reputation as a modern state that welcomes all people. Dubai also created its own
2021 plan with the objective of creating the best place to live and work. It seeks to engage
stakeholders and adopt the best practices in national strategic planning (Executive Council,
2014). Major events, such as the World Expo 2020 and sporting occasions are crucial points
of the plan.
These plans show the UAE is trying to buy cultural appeal by spending on infrastructure,
healthcare, education and entertainment. Investing in culture helps keep the population
happy and reinforces the established social contract. Football specifically has huge appeal
to men and women under 35, a demographic often targeted by radical Islamist groups like
the Muslim Brotherhood. Football and movies can distract the population and keep them
off the streets and away from protests, allowing the current governing system to survive
(Ellwood, 2020).
Moreover, by making the conversation about itself and its contributions, the UAE weaves
a positive narrative to attract prospective business and increase their reputation.21

Abu Dhabi and Dubai
Although they are constituent emirates of the UAE, Abu Dhabi and Dubai operate with certain autonomy. Both seek to increase their prestige through their activities as tourist and
business hubs (and compete with each other to the be the bigger and better in this endeavour). Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, is ruled by the al-Nahyan family and home to 90
per cent of the nation’s oil reserves. It is also the seat of the president. Dubai is the ‘business
emirate’, ruled by the al- Maktoum family, and home to the office of the Prime Minister
(Ulrichsen, 2017). Its dwindling oil supply has compelled the emirate to establish a business-friendly environment with over twenty tax-free zones.22 This business first mentality
made Dubai the city with the most economic growth between 1975 and 2009 (Bruns, 2017).
21

The films Mission: Impossible – Ghost Protocol and Star Wars: The Force Awakens were both filmed in
the UAE. Moreover, the UAE was one of the largest spenders in the US in the 2000s. Their strategy of winning hearts and minds entailed building hospitals, medical centres, donations to charities and even school
systems.
22
In 2016 oil and gas made up 6% of Dubai’s annual budget (Bruns, 2017). This drives the region’s commitment to trade. Without investment, Dubai would lose its global prominence.
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Dubai has attached itself to European football’s elite. Emirates Airlines, the airline of
the emirate of Dubai, sponsors the jerseys of Arsenal, AC Milan, Benfica, Hamburg and
Real Madrid.23 The emirate also hosts academies for Arsenal, Barcelona and Manchester
United, which have established long-lasting, highly visible relationships between Europe,
its clubs and the UAE. Both the ruler of Dubai and the CEO of Emirates recognise the importance of these ties, the former noting that sports are a multi-billion-dollar charm offensive, and the latter stating, ‘sport provides an international platform to connect with our
customer, something vital for the growth strategy of the state-run company’ (Thani and
Heenan, 2016).24
Abu Dhabi’s investment in football has been monumental. Manchester City, Inter Milan
and Real Madrid have all established academies in the capital. Moreover, Etihad Airways,
the state- owned airline, has been sponsoring Manchester City’s jersey and stadium since
2011 to the tune of £400 million (Murphy, 2021). But the crown jewel of their strategy is
City Football Group (CFG) and Manchester City. According to Khaldoon al Mubarak,25 the
CFG project is supposed to show people the true essence of Abu Dhabi (Pitt-Brooke, 2021).

City Football Group
In 2008, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan, the deputy Prime Minister of the UAE, minister of presidential affairs and the direct overseer of the UAE soft power strategy, created
CFG and then purchased Manchester City Football Club (Murphy, 2021). Manchester City
went from little importance to the richest club in the richest league in the world overnight.
CFG broadened the Emirati investment base, diversified revenue streams and most importantly, began to raise the Emirates’ global profile (Thani and Heenan, 2016).
The purchase of Manchester City was politically motivated. Gary Cook, CEO of City in
2008, oversaw the sale of the club and allegedly told Sheikh Mansour ‘we are your proxy
brand for the nation’ (Pitt-Brooke, 2021). Since the purchase, his statement has come to
fruition. City has become a marketing machine for Abu Dhabi. Ads for Etisalat (telecom),
23

Real Madrid: US$85 million per year, Arsenal: US$42 million per year and stadium naming rights, AC
Milan: US$20 million per year (Murphy, 2021).
24
Over one billion people watched the final of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and when Germany won, the medals were distributed by Emirates Airlines flight attendants. The Dubai airline company spent over US$100
million between 2010 and 2014 for the FIFA World Cup rights. They have even partnered with an Abu Dhabi
owned investment company to help finance the remodelling of the Santiago Bernabeu, home to Real Madrid
(Ulrichsen, 2017).
25
Mubarak is a key advisor to Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan. He was made part of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council age 27, he is the CEO of an Abu Dhabi investment firm and he is the chairman of Manchester
City (Montague, 2017).
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Anbar (investment group) and Abu Dhabi Tourism Authority are seen during events at the
aptly named Etihad Stadium.
Abu Dhabi’s investment has gone beyond just the football club. In 2014, ADUG and the
Manchester city council agreed a 10-year deal worth £1 billion to redevelop areas of the
city26 and build six thousand new homes (Ulrichsen, 2017). This investment has bought
credibility and the affection of citizens as reflected in a banner hung at the Etihad Stadium
which says, ‘Manchester thanks you Sheikh Mansour’.
Further support for the club’s owners has grown via a constructed outsider narrative. The
UAE has consistently pushed the idea that Manchester City is the likeable underdog against
the villainous UEFA, galvanising a fanbase that will defend them at all costs (Uddin, April
2021). Manchester City fans have shown unbending loyalty to the club and its owners, even
supporting the government’s trial of a British citizen accused of spying in the UAE (Ronay,
2018). Their passion for football and love for their club encourages fans to overlook the
absence in the UAE of free speech, democracy, an independent media and human rights.
CFG seeks to establish its presence on every continent, by purchasing football clubs, developing football players, playing beautiful football and winning. In 2021, its investment in
football returned unprecedented levels of success with four league titles on four different
continents.27 This has greatly increased CFG’s standing in the world of football as well as
the demand for it to invest in more clubs. Abu Dhabi is even beginning to use football as a
source of diplomacy in the Levant. In 2020, a member of the al-Nahyan family purchased
50% ownership of Beitar Jerusalem, Israel’s most notorious far-right club.28 Using Beitar,
the UAE can establish a political presence in Israel in a subtle manner as they seek to normalise relations with Israel.
Since Abu Dhabi’s purchase of Manchester City, the club has won five Premier League
titles, two FA Cups and six League Cups. It has made the Champions League final and has
signed one of the world’s best coaches, Pep Guardiola (Pitt-Brooke, 2021). However, the
political impact has been even greater. Abu Dhabi has systematically ingrained itself in the
fabric of Manchester and the other cities where it owns clubs. Its ownership has given the
26

A recent report in The Guardian (Chakrabortty, 2022) exposes how bad of a deal this has turned out to
be for the city of Manchester. Prime real estate, previously owned by the city, was sold off at a cut-rate to
ADUG who have created luxury housing and have pocketed the profits in offshore accounts. The same working-class fans who attend Manchester City matches have lost a part of their city to the club’s owners.
27
Manchester City (Europe), Melbourne City (Australia), New York City FC (North America), Mumbai City
(Asia).
28
Beitar Jerusalem is famous for being a far-right anti-Muslim club. The club has strong ties to the Likud
party, and because it has the most fans in Israel, is a useful propaganda tool (Murphy, 2021).
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UAE added prestige and respectability in business and sporting circles alike. It has also
provided local fan support and has created new revenue streams. Moreover, CFG’s clubs
highlight the capacity of the small Gulf nation to build something successful. Most media
attention focuses on CFG’s success as opposed to human rights issues in the UAE. As Ellwood (2020) states, Manchester City is proof that ‘soccer can function globally as a classic
currency of soft power, recognised by very different states and societies.’

Saudi Arabia
Political History
Founded in 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arabic and Islamic absolute monarchy
of 34 million people ruled by the descendants of the House of Saud. The King is the Prime
Minister, he presides over national security, upholds Shariah law and appoints a council of
ministers. The constitution is the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and the version of Islam followed
is Wahhabism. National revenue is highly dependent on oil, which accounts for roughly
90% of Saudi exports (Fatta, 2013).
Saudi Arabia has long been one of the more powerful countries in the region due to its
sovereign wealth fund exceeding US$400 billion. Its religious importance, as home to Mecca and Medina, cannot be understated. Despite lacking a prodigious military force, Saudi
Arabia has relied on coercive measures to maintain its regional power. As the main opponent of Iran in the region, and a major exporter of oil, Saudi Arabia has benefited from
economic and military trade with the US and the UK. However, as Saudi Arabia pivots away
from oil and seeks to modernise, its authoritarian nature and human rights abuses draw increased scrutiny. Reports show over 1,065 executions in just a decade.29 Freedom of speech
is also vigorously suppressed. It is no surprise Freedom House (2022) gave Saudi Arabia a
paltry 7/100 on its freedom scale.30
Saudi Arabia has other concerns: its growing population, the onset of climate change, an
uneasy relationship with Qatar,31 the ongoing proxy war in Yemen and the long-lasting Cold
29

March 12, 2022, reports surfaced Saudi Arabia executed 81 people, including Yemenis and Syrians (Reuters, 2022). The next day Newcastle fans hung a Saudi flag in support of their owners at an away game to
Chelsea (Benge, 2022).
30
Activist Raif Badawi received ten years in prison and one thousand lashes for speaking out (Tifo Football,
2018).
31
Saudi Arabia accuses Qatar of financing terrorist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and Iranian
militant groups who they believe are attempting to subvert the regional order. The Saudi-led blockade was
an attempt to dissuade Qatar from backing these groups, aiding Iran and liberalising its society. However, as
Qatar liberalises social restrictions and reforms its labour system, Saudi Arabia fears potential demands for
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War with Iran which defines its struggle for Islamic superiority within the MENA region.
To distract observers from these issues, Saudi Arabia is trying hard to show the world it is
reinventing itself. Its de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), has
established a national vision plan which will change the face of the nation and capitalise on
the country’s most popular sport, football.

MBS and Vision 2030
MBS became Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia in 2017 (Montague, 2021), and was seen as a
moderate, looking to improve life for the younger population and loosen religious restrictions. He opened cinemas, allowed women to drive and attend football matches and reduced religious police power (Tifo Football, 2018). He was also instrumental in dismantling
the guardianship system, allowing women to get passports and travel on their own, and
ending public flogging and executions for minor crimes (Montague, 2021). These reforms
were received with great approval from Western partners.
MBS was also the author of the Vision 2030 plan, launched in 2016, which he calls ‘an
ambitious but achievable blueprint’ that will strengthen the country’s capacity to become
a ‘global investment powerhouse and gateway to the world’, (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
2016). With the power the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund, or Public Investment Fund
(PIF), ‘the engine behind economic diversity in the Kingdom’ (Montague, 2021), Vision
2030 pushes strategic objectives emphasising the progressive direction of the nation and
improving the lives of its citizens.
Part of the Vision framework is to diversify the nation’s wealth, engage the under-30
population (70% of the total population) and improve the national image (Tarrago, 2019).
To achieve these goals, there is a shift towards the privatisation of companies, especially
football clubs. Under MBS’s mandate, clubs in the Saudi Premier League (now also identified as the Prince Mohammed bin Salman Professional League or MBS Pro League) are
being transferred to private ownership, ideally becoming more profitable and commercially driven. An economically stable league attracts players, coaches and investment. It also
helps reduce pressure on club owners, who up to this point have been members of the royal
family. With this move, MBS hopes the league will improve in quality, appeasing the public
societal and governmental change from its own citizenry. Saudi Arabia’s 2017 decision to cut diplomatic ties
with Qatar can be understood as a two-pronged warning towards anyone threatening regional stability and
the regime’s authority.
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and garnering international attention.
All of MBS’s reforms aim to modernise the nation and create an environment in which
private business can flourish. By changing the domestic situation, the hope is that the West
will see Saudi Arabia as an international partner. However, criticisms of MBS paint a different portrait.
One of his major critics, Jamal Khashoggi, openly refuted MBS’s reformist narrative,
exposing the truth about people being imprisoned for speaking out against the new agenda.32 The Washington Post journalist was subsequently dismembered in a Saudi Embassy
in Istanbul, a murder the CIA has since confirmed was ordered by MBS (Montague, 2021).
As a result, MBS’s reputation, and that of Saudi Arabia, has been tarnished, making them a
pariah in the global community. The Crown Prince, following in the footsteps of his Emirati
mentor, Mohammed Bin Zayed, has turned to football to wash away the stains. It is the ideal tool to repair his international image, distract foreign investors and diversify the economy, leading to greater tourism, an influx of investment and recognition on the world stage.

Involvement with Football
Football’s popularity in the Kingdom began in the 1900s as Muslims from around the world
made the Hajj to Mecca.33 In 1956 the Saudi Arabia Football Federation (SAFF)34 was established and in 1959 Saudi Arabia became a member of FIFA. As football investment grew
in the 1970s, the Saudi Premier League was established, as were stadiums and sports facilities around the country (Fatta, 2013). The large domestic investment paid dividends in the
1990s as Saudi Arabia qualified for the 1994 World Cup, becoming the first Gulf nation to
reach the knockout phase. However, by the turn of the century, infrastructure was crumbling, quality of play was low and the Saudi public’s attention turned to televised European
football (Goldblatt, 2019).
MBS has reignited state investment in football. Jeddah has become the venue for both
the Italian and Spanish Super Cups.35 These events showcase the Kingdom and its capacity
32

In 2017 MBS purged his political enemies in Saudi Arabia. He held them for weeks in a hotel until many
signed over large parts of their fortunes. There were claims of torture and a possible death (Montague,
2021).
33
The first game in Saudi Arabia was organised in Mecca in 1932 for Indonesian pilgrims (Fatta, 2013)
34
Not to be confused with the South Asian Football Federation which uses the same acronym.
35
The deal to host the Spanish Super Cup is valued at €300 million over ten years. The tournament has
also been reconstructed to involve four teams, ensuring a higher potential for El Clasico to be played in the
kingdom. The deal also led to the ban on women attending matches being lifted in 2018, signalling Saudi
Arabia’s desire to be seen as more progressive.
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to host elite competitions. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia signed a deal with the Real Federación Española de Fútbol (RFEF) to send its most talented players to Spanish clubs, creating a long-term relationship with a high-profile European football powerhouse.
Elsewhere, Saudi Arabia has attempted to increase its regional influence by creating the
Southwest Asian Football Federation (SWAFF). This Saudi controlled, unsanctioned organisation proposes hosting events in Saudi territory every year, and would directly compete
with the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) (Dorsey, 2018). It also suggested revamping
the UEFA Champions League in a rejected deal worth US$25 billion. Most importantly, it
has tried to interfere with Qatar’s World Cup hosting rights, by pressuring FIFA to give it
future hosting rights, intellectual property rights and an expanded Club World Cup to be
hosted in Saudi Arabia (Tifo Football, 2018).36
The Kingdom has invested nearly US$1.5 billion in hosting sporting events and placed an
unsuccessful US$600 million bid to replace BeIn Sports as the MENA region Champions
League TV provider. Vision 2030 prioritises the growth of the professional sports industry
and becoming the region’s foremost sports destination is a priority.37 Therefore, it is not
surprising Saudi Arabia is still seeking more opportunities, as with its bid to host both the
Asian Cup in 2027 and the FIFA World Cup in 2030.38 Dorsey (July 2021) posits that if the
World Cup bid proves successful, it would grow the Saudi leisure industry on an exponential scale, distract their young population – thus avoiding potential radicalisation or push
for greater freedoms, polish their national image and help them challenge Qatar. Critics
refer to much of this as sportswashing – using sport to improve reputation.39 Quinn (2021)
states that the Kingdom is looking for affection, but will settle for a change of focus, brought
about by its vast investment in the world’s most popular sport and progressive moves such
as its new women’s league. However, Saudi Arabia’s boldest move has been the 2021 purchase of Newcastle United.

36

Saudi Arabia pushed to have the hosting rights taken away from Qatar. When that did not happen, they
encouraged World Cup expansion to 48 teams, meaning the hosting rights would have to be shared amongst
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (TIFO, 2018). This also did not happen.
37
Private conversation with James Dorsey, July 2022.
38
The Saudi’s are bidding together with Egypt and Greece to host the 2030 World Cup in the year of the
tournament’s centenary.
39
In a brazen sportswashing attempt Messi and Ronaldo were offered nearly €6 million to endorse the Visit
Saudi campaign. Both rejected the offer (Uddin, February 2021).
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Newcastle United
Despite having been in the market for a football club since 2018, Saudi pirating of Qatar’s
BeIn Sports, had prevented any successful club purchase in England. The Al-Ula agreement
settled the pirating matter and Newcastle United ownership was transferred from British
billionaire Mike Ashley to a consortium of the investment firms PCP Capital Partners and
Rueben Brothers and the Saudi Arabian PIF.40 A large portion of the club’s fanbase took to
the streets celebrating the deal, many in traditional Saudi headdress.
The deal is monumental for the Gulf kingdom. Investing late in football compared to
its neighbours, Saudi Arabia now has a foothold in the world’s most watched league. Following the blueprint handed down by Abu Dhabi and Manchester City, Saudi Arabia hope
that its investment in an undervalued asset will pay great political dividends. Significantly,
the Newcastle purchase gives Saudi Arabia leverage in the UK, where the kingdom will
now be seen as patrons of a working-class city and saviours of an underperforming club
(Quinn, 2021). The club will also be a magnet for increased foreign direct investment to
the kingdom.41
Most importantly, as Dr. Ulrichsen (Montague, 2021) explains, ‘The Saudi involvement
in the Newcastle takeover is about buying a prestige asset for state-branding purposes…
There is an intangible factor which the Saudis will be looking for in such an investment
which is more about soft power projection, changing the image of Saudi Arabia abroad and
utilising the mass appeal of football as a way to reach new constituencies.’
The new ownership group of Newcastle is under heavy scrutiny. The PIF is the sovereign
wealth fund of Saudi Arabia, staffed by six government officials and chaired by MBS. Moreover, the PIF reports to the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, also chaired by
MBS. Yet, the takeover deal was accepted by the Premier League on ‘legally binding assurances,’ that Newcastle would not be under direct control of the Saudi monarchy (D’Urso,
2021). Given the PIF is state run, and its entire purpose is to invest state assets over the long
term to provide for its citizens, it seems farfetched to claim that Newcastle will not be run
in a way that directly benefits Saudi Arabia.42

40

PCP - 10% ownership stake, Rueben Brothers-10% ownership stake, PIF-80% ownership stake.
This investment is critical. In 2021, FDI had only hit one quarter of the goal set in 2016, despite over US$1
billion in Saudi money being invested into hosting and sponsoring sporting events (Rome, 2021).
42
Reports show the PIF hired KARV Communications on 25/02/2019 to ‘create a clear distinction between
the PIF and the political leadership in Saudi Arabia.’ This is an attempt to obscure the truth. (D’Urso, 2021).
41
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The purchase has also been branded as blatant sportswashing. Human Rights Watch
and Amnesty International claim it is distracting from the ongoing proxy war in Yemen and
human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia. Newcastle’s success will help curate a polished image
of the kingdom sidestepping the political realities. Amanda Staveley, part owner of PCP
Capital Partners and the public face of the takeover, claims that the new owners take human
rights very seriously and that the investment is not an example of sportswashing (D’Urso,
2021). However, Jamal Khashoggi’s widow puts the true nature of MBS and the Newcastle
purchase into perspective:
‘Since the murder, many companies and countries don’t want to partner or do
business because of the backlash. He wants legitimacy and credibility. Buying a
team like Newcastle in the Premier League, in one of the most powerful countries
in Europe and the world? You buy legitimacy in the international community.
He’s accepted and celebrated for rescuing a struggling team. Everyone then sees
everything in a different light.’
(Montague, 2021)
Saudi Arabia’s investment in football is bringing it increased attention; it hopes foreign
investment and greater international standing will follow. The PIF has already secured investments in Uber, Disney and Starbucks, and continues to finance Saudi modernisation
projects such as NEOM and Qiddiya. As Nick McGeehan, Human Rights Researcher, puts
it, the investment is not about making money, but about using high-value brands to present
itself as progressive and tolerant (Delaney, 2018).

Conclusion
This paper set out to expand the scholarship in the study of sports in international relations by establishing Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s motivations for investing in
football. To do so, Nye’s theory of soft power was explained, and its use by each nation
individually examined.
Nye’s theory is based on the principle of attraction, which he posits is rooted in culture,
values and policies. Due to their connection to Islam and their human rights concerns,
Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia suffer from an attraction deficit. Seeing that the pull of
fossil fuels – the resource which has kept them relevant in international affairs until now
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– will wane in the coming decades, all three nations have begun to reinvent themselves
in the hopes of being more accepted in the international community. Using football allows these nations to create long-term relationships between the state and the communities where their clubs play. Moreover, their investment creates constant opportunities for
nation-branding, painting these states in a new light and increasing their cultural appeal.
The attraction of football is its universal popularity. As Goldblatt (2019) explains, over
3 billion people watched some of the 2018 World Cup, and nearly 40% of the audience
was female. Even nations that did not qualify, like China and India, had vast amounts of
fans tuning in. Moreover, football has universally understood values, and a shared culture
which helps foster unity.43 Football also provides lucrative economic opportunities and often earns owners praise from their fan bases.
Given its lack of military power and its much publicised falling out with neighbouring
nations, Qatar is seeking to protect itself by gaining international renown. To do so, it has
purchased PSG, linking Qatar with Paris. It has created first-class sporting facilities, sponsored major European clubs like FC Barcelona and will host the FIFA World Cup in 2022.
Qatar’s sponsorship of FC Barcelona cannot be overlooked. Barcelona’s social values, ties
to UNICEF and ‘més que un club’ ethos grant Qatar new legitimacy on the international
stage (Ginesta, 2013). It is recognised as an important intermediary in the Middle East,
especially by the US, and it is proving to be a reliable business partner to many Western
European nations.
However, Qatar’s legitimacy and international renown will be tested at the upcoming
World Cup. If human rights issues, lack of available hotel rooms, lack of alcohol and congested transportation prove to be the primary talking points throughout the tournament,
Qatar’s star will fade quickly. The stereotype of the Arab-Islamic nation as a representative
of ‘the other’ will return, and billions will have been spent with little return to show for it.
The UAE use of football focuses on turning the nation into a global transportation and
business hub. Abu Dhabi and Dubai have spent billions sponsoring events and clubs in Europe and around the world, ensuring that their clubs become household names.
Moreover, Abu Dhabi has worked hard to establish City Football Group which invests
in clubs on every continent and has become synonymous with footballing success. Despite
43

Despite wars and national borders dividing both North and South Korea and North and South Yemen,
both sets of divided nations have used football to break bread, promote unity and maintain the notion of a
single ethnic nation (Stevenson and Alaug, 2008).
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occasional backlash regarding human rights issues, or opportunistic business deals, by establishing successful football clubs and sponsorship deals, the UAE has increased its international credibility and drawn the attention of investors, becoming an indispensable part of
the global economy in the process.
Saudi Arabia is the newest soft power player in the football world. Having seen the benefits its neighbours have reaped from investing in football, the Kingdom has joined in. Saudi Arabia is looking to reinvent its image after the war in Yemen and the killing of Jamal
Khashoggi. Hosting events like the Spanish Super Cup, buying Newcastle United and making progressive changes to Saudi society are creating connections between Saudi Arabia
and other nations. The rewards of this project are beginning to show in northern England
where the talk of Saudi blood-money and human rights abuses has dissipated as Newcastle
Football Club’s results on the field have improved. Newcastle are showing signs of competitiveness, but more so, they seem to be well run, and have likeable and knowledgeable
characters like Eddie Howe and Dan Ashworth in charge now. This has reenergised the
connection between the fans and the club and could help foster goodwill.44
The use of football to create goodwill and ensure survival beyond fossil fuels has also given rise to backlash. Not only has it opened the door for possible soft disempowerment, but
it has created the sportswashing narrative. These states present themselves as progressive
nations through football, and thereby wash their hands clean of their human rights abuses.
When effective, such sportswashing gives international legitimacy, but because portions
of the media have recognised it as a screen for such abuses, the sponsorship and fostering
of football has also led to heavy criticism of these states by the international media. This is
especially the case for Qatar. As the first World Cup in the Middle East approaches, scrutiny
over workers’ rights and LGBTQ+ issues are ever increasing. Fans are even voicing their
support for compensation pay for workers to be given from tournament prize money (Amnesty International, 2022).
The connection between sports and politics is as old as time, however the use of football
by states to increase their public profile and international appeal is a relatively new phenomenon. According to journalist Miguel Delaney (2018), football is in a new age of geo44

Not all fans are on board. A recent report in the Middle East Eye (Uddin, 2022) discusses a small group
of 20-25 Newcastle fans who have come together in rejection of their new owners. They believe the values
of the Saudi government and their owners do not represent Newcastle as a city or football club. These fans
have authored their own magazine, Hailstones in the Desert, touching on sportswashing, the Saudi-sponsored war in Yemen and homophobia in the kingdom.
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politics, as evidenced by state-run clubs and the recent asset seizure of Russian oligarchs
who own football teams. The future will determine if using football as a tool of soft power
attraction has in fact increased the international legitimacy of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
UAE. However, there is no doubt that they are attempting to become more internationally
relevant through football. They have everything to gain by doing so, after all, football is now
‘sanctuary… the ultimate mark of acceptance’ (Smith, 2022).

– 33 –

Bibliography
Afuh Tayimlong, R. (2017). ‘Football, Soft Power and Contemporary International Relations: an Analysis of the Political Gains Pursued by State and Non-State Actors From
the Game of Football’. Cameroon News Agency, [On-line] 10 July 2017. http://cameroonnewsagency.com/football-soft-power-contemporary-international- relations
analysis political-gains-pursued-state-non-state-actors-game-football/
Akkas, E. (2021, November 5). ‘Gulf countries invade the Euro Football Pitch’. The Arab
Gulf States Institute in Washington. Retrieved November 18, 2021, from https://agsiw.
org/gulf- countries-invade-the-euro-football-pitch/.
Al Jazeera (2021, October 13). ‘Qatar FM on GCC blockade, Iran and engaging with the
Taliban’. Al Jazeera. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2021/10/6/qatars-bein-sports-says-saudi-arabia-to-lift-ban-on-channels.
Al Jazeera (2021, October 7). ‘Saudi Arabia set to lift ban on Qatar’s beIN Sports network’. Al Jazeera. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2021/10/6/qatars-bein-sports-says-saudi-arabia-to-lift-ban-on-channels.
Amnesty International (2022, September 15). ‘Qatar: Global survey shows overwhelming demand for FIFA to compensate World Cup migrant workers’. Amnesty International. Retrieved September 21, 2022, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2022/09/qatar-global-survey-shows-overwhelming-demand-for-fifa-to-compensate-world-cup-migrant-workers/.
Amnesty International (2021, November 16). ‘Qatar: One year to make good on promises
to migrant workers as progress stagnates’. Amnesty International. Retrieved November
16, 2021, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/11/qatar-one-year-tomake- good-on-promises-to-migrant-workers-as-progress-stagnates/.
Antwi-Boateng, O. (2013). ‘The Rise of Qatar as a Soft Power and the Challenges’. European Scientific Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 10, December.
Aras, B. and F. Ozbay (2008). ‘Turkish-Armenian Relations: Will Football Diplomacy Work?’. SETA Policy Brief, 24, setadc.org. Retrieved November 19, 2021, from
chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/http://setadc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/SETA_Policy_Brief_No_24_Bulent_Aras_Fatih_Ozbay.pdf.
AS.COM (2018) ‘Saudi Arabia could be next on FIFA’s list after Peru and Spain’.
– 34 –

As.com [On-line], 20th February. https://en.as.com/en/2018/02/20/football/1519140355_481274.html.
Bainbridge, S. and A. Moroney (2018). ‘The privatization of Saudi Arabia’s Football Clubs:
An Update’. Lexology [On-line], 31st July. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=69678ed9-f736-4679-81ae-10cf4670f88a
Benge, J. [@jamesbenge]. (2022, March, 13). The day after the Saudi Arabian state
announced it had executed 81 people, a visiting Newcastle fan unfurls a Saudi flag in
the Stamford Bridge away end. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/jamesbenge/status/1502996642001268739?s=11
Brannagan, P.M. and R. Giulianotti (2015). ‘Soft Power and Soft Disempowerment: Qatar,
Global Sport and football’s 2022 World Cup finals’. Leisure Studies [On-line], Vol. 24,
Issue 6. DOI: 10.1080/02614367.2014.964291.
Britannica (nd). ‘Qatar: Facts and Stats’, Britannica [On-line]. https://www.britannica.
com/facts/Qatar
Bruns, K.S. (2017) ‘Understanding Dubai’s city diplomacy: actors and drivers’. International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp.282–300.
Callaghan, L. (2021, November 14). ‘Qatar 2022: Dying for the World Cup’. The Sunday
Times. Retrieved November 16, 2021, from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/qatar-2022- dying-for-the-world-cup-r3kh38qnd.
Chakrabortty, A. (2022, July 21). ‘How a great English city sold itself to Abu Dhabi’s elite
– and not even for a good price’. The Guardian. Retrieved September 19, 2022, from
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/21/great-english-city-soldabu-dhabis-elite-manchester
Chanavat, N. (2017). ‘French football, foreign investors: global sports as country branding’. Journal of Business Strategy, Vol. 38, Issue: 6, pp.3-10.
Coakley, J. (2008). ‘Sports, Politics and International Relations in the Twentieth Century’.
The International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol. 25, Issue 13.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09523360802367281?journalCode=fhsp20
Conn, D. (2013, July 30). ‘Abu Dhabi accused of “using Manchester City to launder image”’. The Guardian. Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https://www.theguardian.com/
football/2013/jul/30/manchester-city-human-rights-accusations.
– 35 –

Cornelissen, S. (2010). ‘The Geopolitics of Global Aspiration: Sport Mega-Events and
Emerging Powers’. The International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol. 27, pp.
3008– 3025.
Crafton, A. and M. Slater (2021, October 6). ‘Saudi Arabia reverses bein Sport Ban after
four and a half years’. The Athletic. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://theathletic.com/news/saudi-arabia-reverses-bein-sport-ban/olc80FZA5pPr/?amp=1.
Crafton, A. (2021, August 10). ‘How paris saint-germain signed Lionel Messi’. The Athletic. Retrieved November 3, 2021, from https://theathletic.com/2757739/2021/08/10/
how-paris- saint-germain-signed-lionel-messi/.
Crafton, A. (2021, December 16). ‘The English FA and a very uncomfortable relationship with Qatar’. The Athletic. Retrieved December 22, 2021, from https://theathletic.com/2988697/2021/12/07/the-english-fa-and-a-very-uncomfortable-relationship-with-qatar/
Delaney, M. [@MiguelDelaney]. (2021, October, 18). Neville’s view on sport being a
force for good is optimistic but the evidence indicates its incorrect. These countries
are instead using sport. The tail doesn’t wag the dog here. Abu Dhabi’s human rights
record has become much worse in the 13 years they have owned City. [Tweet]. Twitter.
https://twitter.com/migueldelaney/status/1450217846886346754?s=11
Delaney, M. (2018, March 2). ‘Human rights abuses, questionable sponsors and Trump:
how geopolitics are becoming the worrying root of football’. The Independent. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/
news/geopolitics-in-football-qatar-abu-dhabi-man-city-psg-trump-manchester-united-a8235996.html.
Delaney, M. (2020, June 17). ‘Saudi Arabia’s takeover of Newcastle is nakedly political –
it’s about sportswashing, not football’. The Independent. Retrieved October 14, 2021,
from https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-league/newcastle-united-saudi- arabia-takeover-latest-staveley-ashley-a9468236.html.
Dichter, H. and A. L. Johns (2020). Diplomatic games: Sport, Statecraft, and international relations since 1945. University Press of Kentucky.
Discover Qiddiya (2021) Qiddiya. Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https://qiddiya.com/.
Dorsey, J. (2021, July 1). ‘Saudi transport and logistics plan steps up competition with
Gulf states’. Retrieved October 23, 2021, from https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.
– 36 –

com/2021/07/saudi-transport-and-logistics-plan.html.
Dorsey, J. (2021, June 13). ‘Saudi Arabia steps up effort to replace UAE and Qatar as go-to
regional hub’. Retrieved October 23, 2021, from https://www.jamesmdorsey.net/post/
saudi-arabia-steps-up-effort-to-replace-uae-and-qatar-as-go-to-regional-hub.
Dorsey, J. (2018). ‘Middle Eastern Rivalry Spills into Asian Soccer Pitches’. https://www.
jamesmdorsey.net/post/middle-eastern-rivalry-spills-onto-asian-soccer-pitches
Dorsey, J. M. (2017, September 8). ‘Soft Power and football: Qatar vs. UAE: The not-sobeautiful game’. Qantara. Retrieved November 3, 2021, from https://en.qantara.de/
content/soft-power-and-football-qatar-vs-uae-the-not-so-beautiful- game.
Dorsey, J. M. (2021, November 23). ‘Qatar World Cup Sparks Healthy Controversy Across
Multiple Issues’. Retrieved November 23, 2021, from https://www.jamesmdorsey.net/
post/qatari-world-cup-sparks-healthy-controversy-across-multiple-issues-1.
Dorsey, J. M. (2016). The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. Hurst.
D’Urso, J. (2021, October 14). ‘Newcastle takeover: Why PIF and the Saudi state are
the same thing’. The Athletic. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://theathletic.
com/2886837/2021/10/14/newcastle-takeover-why-pif-and-the-saudi- state-are-thesame-thing/.
DW Kickoff (2021, November 12). Qatar 2022 - why we all take part after all. YouTube.
Retrieved January 13, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8I2SqSi_EGs.
Ellwood, D. (2020, June 23). ‘Geopolitics, Sport, Soft Power: Soccer and the Arab Gulf’.
USC Center on Public Diplomacy Blog. Retrieved November 3, 2021, from https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/geopolitics-sport- soft-power-soccer-and-arab-gulf.
The Economist. (2021, October 8). ‘Why do authoritarian regimes like to buy English
football clubs?’. The Economist. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://www.
economist.com/the- economist-explains/2021/10/08/why-do-authoritarian-regimes-like-to-buy-english- football-clubs.
Executive Council of the Government of Dubai. (2014). ‘Dubai Plan 2021’. Retrieved December 6, 2021, from https://www.dubaiplan2021.ae/.
FARAS (Future for Advanced Research and Studies) (2018) ‘Revealing Roles: How Sports
Reflect Middle East’s Political Interactions’. Future UAE, Issue No.382.
https://futureuae.com/FORUM/Mainpage/Item/3766/revealing-roles-how-sports-reflect-middle-easts-political-interactions
– 37 –

Fatta, A. (2013). History of sports in Saudi Arabia and current situation. Michigan State
University.
Felsch, M. (2016) ‘Qatar’s rising international influence: a case of soft power?’. Conjuntura Internacional, Vol. 13, No. 1, November, pp. 21-35.
FIFA (2021, December 14). ‘FIFA discusses human rights with political stakeholders and
experts ahead of Qatar 2022.’ (2021, December 14). FIFA. Retrieved December 16,
2021, from https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/qatar2022/media-releases/fifa-discusses-human-rights-with-political-stakeholders-and-experts.
FIFA (2021, December 13). ‘Yorke puts classy Qataris under the microscope’. Retrieved
December 13, 2021, from https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/arabcup/arabcup2021/news/yorke-puts-classy-qataris-under-the-microscope.
FIFA (2022, January 12). ‘Saudi Arabia stages first-ever nationwide women’s league’.
Retrieved January 14, 2022, from https://www.fifa.com/womens-football/news/saudi-arabia-stages-first-ever- nationwide-womens-league
Ford, M. (2021, November 11). ‘Rummenigge: Bayern Munich “made good money” from
Qatar deal’. DW.com. Retrieved November 17, 2021, from https://www.dw.com/en/
ex-bayern-munich-ceo-rummenigge-we-made-good-money-from- qatar-sponsorship/a-59792847.
Freedom House (2022). ‘Saudi Arabia: Freedom in the world 2022 country report’. Freedom House. Retrieved November 9, 2022, from https://freedomhouse.org/country/
saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2022.
Gallarotti, G.; Al-Filali, I. Y. (2012). ‘Saudi Arabia’s Soft Power’. International Studies, 49
(3-4), 233–261. doi:10.1177/0020881714532707
Gary Neville in Qatar (2019). Sky Sports. Retrieved October 23, 2021, from https://www.
sky.com/watch/title/programme/54d626a0-caa7-4a64-9cca-cd67e1f032cc.
General Secretariat for Development Planning (2008). Qatar National Development
Strategy 2011-2016 (2008). Qatar National Government. Retrieved December 8, 2021,
from https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/nds1/Documents/Downloads/NDS_EN_0.pdf.
General Sport Authority (n.d.). Sports history in Saudi Arabia. King Abdullah Sports
City. Retrieved December 13, 2021, from http://www.kasc.com/en/about-sports-city/
sports-history-saudi-arabia.
Ginesta, X. (2013). ‘What is the next step? The champions league clubs and their spon– 38 –

sors. From Bwin to Qatar Sports Investment’. Soccer & Society, 14:1, pp. 66-79, DOI:10.
1080/14660970.2012.69268.
Goldblatt, D. (2021). Age of football: Soccer and the 21st Century. W.W. Norton & Company.
Gough, C. (2021, September 8). ‘NFL revenue by year’. Statista. Retrieved January 13,
2022, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/193457/total-league-revenue-of-thenfl-since-2005/
Government Communications Office and Qatar National Government (2008). Qatar National Vision 2030. National Government of Qatar. Retrieved October 23, 2021, from
https://www.gco.gov.qa/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/GCO-QNV-English.pdf.
GCO (Government Communications Office). ‘Sport in Qatar’. Media Center / In Focus.
https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/focus/sport-en/
Government Communications Office State of Qatar. (2021, May 30). ‘Labour reform’. National Government of Qatar. Retrieved November 4, 2021, from https://www.gco.gov.
qa/en/focus/labour-reform/.
Government of the UAE (2020, November 8). ‘Sports in the UAE’. Government of the
UAE. Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/culture/
sports-and-recreation.
Grant Liberty (2021, March 29). ‘Saudi Arabia’s $1.5bn sports-washing programme’.
Grant Liberty. Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https://grantliberty.org/saudi-arabias-1-5bn-sports-washing-programme/.
Griffin, T. R. (2019). ‘National Identity, social legacy and Qatar 2022: The Cultural Ramifications of FIFA’s first Arab World Cup’. Soccer & Society, 20 (7-8), pp. 1000–1013.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2019.1680499
Grix, Jonathan and Donna Lee (2013). ‘Soft Power, Sports Mega-Events and Emerging
States: The Lure of the Politics of Attraction’. Global Society, 27 (4), pp. 521–536. doi:1
0.1080/13600826.2013.827632
Harris, R. (2021, December 29). ‘World Cup hotel shortage for Supporters Planning Qatar
Trips’. AP NEWS. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from https://apnews.com/article/soccer-sports- travel-lifestyle-business-bc27c4b365dc57a85fd08859090185ef
Hough, P. (2008). ‘“Make goals not war”: The contribution of international football to world
peace’. The International Journal of the History of Sport, 25 (10), pp. 1287 – 1305.
Human Rights Watch. (2020, November 4). ‘Qatar: Significant labor and Kafala Reforms’.
– 39 –

Human Rights Watch. Retrieved November 4, 2021, from https://www.hrw.org/
news/2020/09/24/qatar-significant-labor-and-kafala-reforms#.
Infantino, G. (2018, December 1). ‘The power of football’ [Speech Transcript]. FIFA.
https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/7e5d167208439c1d/original/gum06wkig0qvkb8pk7rgpdf.pdf
International Labour Organisation (2021, March 19). ‘Qatar’s new minimum wage enters
into force’. Retrieved November 4, 2021, from https://www.ilo.org/beirut/countries/
qatar/WCMS_775981/lang--en/index.htm#:~:text=Tools&text=DOHA%20(ILO%20
News)%20%E2%80%93%20On,for%20the%20new%20minimum%20thresholds.
Khalid, T. (2021, January 6). ‘Full transcript of alula GCC summit declaration: Bolstering gulf unity’. Al Arabiya English. Retrieved January 23, 2022, from https://english.
alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2021/01/06/Full-transcript-of-AlUla-GCC-Summit-Declaration-Bolstering-Gulf-unity.
Keatinge, T. (2017, June 12). ‘Why Qatar is the focus of terrorism claims’. BBC News.
Retrieved January 22, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-40246734.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2016). ‘Homepage – Vision 2030’. Government of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia. Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/.
Kobiercki, M. (2013). ‘Sport in International Relations. Expectations, Possibilities and
EFFECTS’. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1/2013.
Kourgiotis, P. (2020). ‘“Moderate Islam” made in the United Arab Emirates: Public diplomacy and the politics of containment’. Religions, 11 (1), 43. https://doi.org/10.3390/
rel11010043
Landay, J., & Pamuk, H. (2021, November 12). ‘Blinken says Qatar to act as U.S. diplomatic representative in Afghanistan’. Reuters. Retrieved November 18, 2021, from https://
www.reuters.com/world/exclusive-qatar-act-us-diplomatic-representative-afghanistan-official-2021-11-12/.
Lange, D. (2021, September 10). ‘European soccer market size 2006-2020’. Statista.
Retrieved January 13, 2022, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/261223/european-soccer- market-total-revenue/.
Law, B. and A. Digest, A. (2021, July 19). ‘How Dubai and Abu Dhabi see the World Cup’.
Fair Observer. Retrieved November 3, 2021, from https://www.fairobserver.com/re– 40 –

gion/middle_east_north_africa/william-bill-law-arab-digest-qatar-news-world-cupdubai-abu-dhabi-uae-united-arab-emirates-23891/.
Manchester City Football Club, Media Department. (2022, January 27). ‘Aldar becomes
official real estate partner of Manchester City Football Club’ [Press release]. Manchester City. Retrieved January 29, 2022, from https://amp-mancity- com.cdn.ampproject.
org/c/s/amp.mancity.com/news/club/aldar-manchester-city- partnership-agreement-63778811
Melnaes, H. (2021, November 3). ‘The trial of Abdullah Ibhais’. Josimarfootball.com. Retrieved November 10, 2021, from http://josimarfootball.com/the-trial-of-abdullah-ibhais/.
Michaelson, R. (2021, March 28). ‘Saudi Arabia has spent at least $1.5bn on ‘sportswashing’, report reveals’. The Guardian. Retrieved October 23, 2021, from https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/28/saudi-arabia-has-spent-at-least-15bn-on-sportswashing-report-reveals.
Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (2018). ‘Qatar Second National Development Strategy 2018-2022’. Qatar National Government. Retrieved December 8, 2021,
from https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/knowledge/Documents/NDS2Final.pdf.
Montague, J. (2021, October 6). ‘Explained: Why does Saudi Arabia want to buy Newcastle United?’. The Athletic. Retrieved October 14, 2021, from https://theathletic.
com/1788335/2021/10/06/why-does-saudi-arabia-want-to-buy- newcastle-united/.
Montague, J. (2018). The Billionaires Club: the unstoppable rise of football’s super-rich
owners. Bloomsbury Sport.
Murphy, A. (2021, March 11). ‘Beitar and Beyond: The United Arab Emirates and Qatar’s
use of Football as Soft Power. TRT World Research Centre. Retrieved November 10,
2021, from https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/featured/beitar-and-beyond-the-united-arab-emirates-and-qatars-use-of-football-as-soft-power/.
NOS Voetbal. (2022, September 21). ‘Steun voor Nederlandse onelove-campagne: Acht
Landen in Qatar met regenboogband’. NOS.nl - Nieuws, Sport en Evenementen. Retrieved September 21, 2022, from https://nos.nl/collectie/13873/artikel/2445416-steun-voor-nederlandse-onelove-campagne-acht-landen-in-qatar-met-regenboogband.
Nye, J. (1990). ‘Soft Power’. Foreign Policy, Vol. 80, pp. 153–171. https://doi.
org/10.2307/1148580
Nye, J. (2008). ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’. The Annals of the Amer– 41 –

ican Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, Issue 1. https://
doi/10.1177/0002716207311699.
Nye, J. S. (2009). ‘Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power’. Foreign Affairs, 88 (4),
pp. 160–163. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699631.
Owen, J. (2021, November 21). ‘Qatar’s World Cup an ‘act of economic madness’ that will
leave the state worse off, experts say’. inews.co.uk. Retrieved November 23, 2021, from
https://inews.co.uk/news/world/qatar-world-cup-act-of-economic-madness-expertsclaim-1308689.
Panja, T. (2022, August 24). ‘At top of european soccer, fears that rules don’t apply to
all’. The New York Times. Retrieved August 27, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.
com/2022/08/24/sports/soccer/champions-league-psg-nasser.html.
Pattisson, P. (2019, December 10). ‘Qatar Stadium Deaths: The dark side of the glittering
venue hosting Liverpool’. The Guardian. Retrieved October 24, 2021, from https://
www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/dec/10/qatar-stadium-deaths-thedark-side-of-liverpools-glittering-world-cup-venue.
Pattisson, P. (2021, August 26). ‘Qatar has failed to explain up to 70% of migrant worker
deaths in past 10 years – Amnesty’. The Guardian. Retrieved October 24, 2021, from
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/aug/26/qatar-has-failed-toexplain-up-to-70-of-migrant-worker-deaths-in-past-10-years-amnesty.
Pattisson, P. and N. McIntyre (2021, February 23). ‘Revealed: 6,500 migrant workers have
died in Qatar since World Cup awarded’. The Guardian. Retrieved November 3, 2021,
from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/23/revealed-migrant-worker-deaths-qatar-fifa-world-cup-2022.
Perez, J. I. (2021, September 28). ‘El Partido Mas Caro del Mundo’. MARCA. Retrieved
October 24, 2021, from https://www.marca.com/futbol/champions-league/2021/09/2
8/6152b90122601d81628b45e1.html.
Petersen, J. (2021, November 10). ‘Bayern und katar: “ich habe mich richtig geschämt”’.
kicker.de. Retrieved November 10, 2021, from https://www.kicker.de/bayern-undkatar-ich-habe- mich-richtig-geschaemt-877782/artikel.
Pitt-Brooke, J. (2021, December 18). ‘Newcastle v Manchester City - two English football
teams, two middle eastern allies’. The Athletic. Retrieved December 22, 2021, from
https://theathletic.com/3011193/2021/12/18/newcastle-v-manchester-city-two-eng– 42 –

lish- football-teams-two-middle-eastern-allies/.
Pride in Football [@prideinfootball] (2021, October 9) Our statement regarding Saudi
Arabia’s takeover of Newcastle United (Tweet) . Twitter. Retrieved October 14, 2021,
from https://twitter.com/prideinfootball/status/1446844599973072898.
Quinn, C. (2021, October 8). ‘Morning Brief: Saudi Arabia’s Soft Power Play’. Foreign Policy. Retrieved December 13, 2021, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/08/saudiarabia-mbs-newcastle-united-soft-power-play/.
Raab, A. (2012) ‘Soccer in the Middle East: an introduction’. Soccer & Society, 13:5-6, pp.
619-638, DOI: 10.1080/14660970.2012.730766
Reuters (2022, March 12). ‘Saudi Arabia executes 81 men in 24 hours’. The Guardian.
Retrieved March 20, 2022, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/12/
saudi-arabia-executes-men-in-one-day.
Robinson, K. (2021, March 23). ‘What is the kafala system?’ Council on Foreign Relations.
Retrieved September 18, 2022, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-kafala-system?gclid=CjwKCAjwg5uZBhATEiwAhhRLHuL0ZbQF6clg91yTAaS6ucWK0Fg-zuW6HovYxkq9XXndvqmn5JcUhxoCRFMQAvD_BwE.
Rome, N. (2021, May 26). ‘Saudi pursuit of soft power through soccer: Saudi Arabia
aims to match what UAE and Qatar have achieved’. Georgetown Security Studies
Review. Retrieved November 3, 2021, from https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.
org/2021/05/25/saudi-pursuit-of-soft-power-through-soccer-saudi-arabia-aims-tomatch-what-uae-and-qatar-have-achieved/.
San-Eugenio, J., X. Ginesta and J. Xifra (2015): ‘Peace, sports diplomacy and corporate
social responsibility: a case study of Football Club Barcelona Peace Tour 2013’, Soccer
& Society, Vol. 18, pp. 836-848. DOI: 10.1080/14660970.2015.1067796.
Sagnier, P. (2021, July 26). ‘Sportswashing: The Gulf countries’ strategy to mask abysmal Human Rights Records’. FairPlanet. Retrieved November 5, 2021, from https://
www.fairplanet.org/story/sportswahing-the-gulf-countries%E2%80%99-strategy-to-mask-abysmal-human-rights-records/.
Saudi Arabia Football Federaton (n.d.). ‘Saudi Arabia Senior National Team Achievements’. Saudi Arabian Football Federation. Retrieved December 13, 2021, from https://
www.saff.com.sa/en/nationalteams.php?id=1&type=3.
Seymour, M. (2020, September 14). ‘The Problem with Soft Power’. Foreign Policy
– 43 –

Research Institute. Retrieved January 22, 2022, from https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/09/the-problem-with-soft-power/.
Slater, M. (2019, November 21). ‘Qatar say they’ve improved workers’ rights but can we
take them seriously when people are still dying?’. The Athletic. Retrieved November 18,
2021, from https://theathletic.com/1396617/2019/11/21/qatar-say-theyve-improvedworkers- rights-but-can-we-take-them-seriously-when-people-are-still- dying/?source=user_shared_article.
Smith, R. (2022, March 11). ‘Roman Abramovich and the End of Soccer’s Oligarch Era’.
The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/sports/soccer/roman-abramovich-chelsea.html.
Stevenson, T. B., & Alaug, A. K. (2008). ‘Sports diplomacy and emergent nationalism:
Football links between the two Yemens, 1970-1990’. Anthropology of the Middle East,
3 (2), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.3167/ame.2008.030202.
Suderman, A. (2021, November 23). ‘World Cup host Qatar used ex-CIA officer to spy on
FIFA’. AP NEWS. Retrieved November 23, 2021, from https://apnews.com/article/soccer-sports-business-migration-middle-east-d9716b62fc69ab88beb3553d402da7d1.
Tarrago, J. (2019, March 9). ‘Futbol Premeditado: Qatar y Arabia Saudi’. Beers and Politics. Retrieved October 23, 2021, from https://beersandpolitics.com/futbol-premeditado-qatar-y-arabia-saudi.
Thani, S., & Heenan, T. (2016). ‘The ball may be round but football is becoming increasingly Arabic: Oil money and the rise of the new football order’. Soccer & Society, 18 (7),
pp. 1012– 1026. https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2015.1133416.
Tifo Football (2018, December 30). Saudi Arabia: The secret power in world football?.
Retrieved February 01, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnU8OF9dN8g&list=WL&index=36&t=324s
Trillas, F. (2018) Pan y fútbol. El deporte rey, espejo de la economía global. Barcelona:
Alternativas Economicas.
TyC Sports. (2022, August 25). ‘Locura por la Selección Argentina: se agotaron las entradas vs. Arabia Saudita y México para el Mundial de Qatar 2022’. TyC Sports. Retrieved
September 18, 2022, from https://www.tycsports.com/seleccion-argentina/locura-porla-seleccion-argentina-se-agotaron-las-entradas-vs-arabia-saudita-y-mexico-para-elmundial-de-qatar-2022-id460343.html.
– 44 –

UAE Soft Power Council (2017, September). ‘The UAE Soft Power Strategy’ [Press release]. Government of the UAE. Retrieved January 28, 2022, from https://u.ae/
en/about-the-uae/strategies-initiatives-and-awards/federal-governments-strategies-and-plans/the-uae-soft-power-strategy
Uddin, R. (2020, May 19). ‘Qatar’s Nasser Al-Khelaifi named most influential person
in football’. Middle East Eye. Retrieved November 3, 2021, from https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/qatar-nasser-al-khelaifi-most-influential-football.
Uddin, R. (2021, April 27). ‘PSG vs Manchester City: How gulf-owned teams diverged on
football’s future’. Middle East Eye. Retrieved November 4, 2021, from https://www.
middleeasteye.net/big-story/qatar-uae-psg-manchester-city-european-super-league.
Uddin, R. (2021, February 26). ‘Lionel Messi urged by families of prisoners to reject Saudi
tourism deal’. Middle East Eye. Retrieved November 3, 2021, from https://www.middleeasteye.net/lionel-messi-saudi-arabia-tourism-partnership-reject.
Uddin, R. (2022, October 7). ‘A year on, Newcastle fans’ opposition to Saudi takeover
gathers pace’. Middle East Eye. Retrieved October 11, 2022, from https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-newcastle-takeover-fans-oppose-one-year-on.
Ulrichsen, K. (2016). The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics and Policy-Making (1st
ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315748023.
United Nations (2019). ‘Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: Preliminary Findings
from its visit to Qatar (3 - 14 November 2019)’. United Nations. Retrieved November
16, 2021, from https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25296&LangI D=E.
World Health Organisation (2021, October 18). ‘State of Qatar and WHO team up for
a healthy and safe FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022’. World Health Organisation. Retrieved October 23, 2021, from https://www.who.int/initiatives/sports-and-health/
healthy-2022-world-cup#:~:text=WHO%20and%20the%20State%20of,sporting%20
events%20in%20the%20future.
ZDF Sportstudio. [@sportstudio]. (December 12, 2021). Nach @ZDF-Informationen:
rund 15.000 Gastarbeiter sind in Katar seit der WM-Vergabe 2010 ums Leben gekommen. Das belegen neue Daten von Amnesty International. @NcGeehan @
MarkusHarm #wm2022. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/sportstudio/status/1470045212613480455?s=20
– 45 –

Appendix: Timelines
Qatari involvement in Football
•

1940s Football arrives in Qatar with the influx of British oil workers

•

1972 Qatar becomes a member nation of FIFA

•

1975 Qatar appoint former English footballer Frank Wignall as head coach of the
national team

•

2003 The Q-League is launched, each club is allotted US$10 million. Stars from
big European leagues like Stefan Effenberg, Gabriel Batistuta and Frank Leboeuf
sign contracts in Qatar. Eventually the league is rebranded the Qatar Stars League
(Goldblatt, 2019)

•

2004 Qatar opens Aspire Academy, a state-of-the-art training centre for football
and other sports

•

2 December 2010 Qatar win the hosting rights to the 2022 FIFA World Cup This
will be the first ever World Cup in the Middle East. (Griffin, 2019)

•

13 December 2010 QSI and FC Barcelona agree a sponsorship deal for €165 million over six seasons (Eugenio, Ginesta, Xifra, 2015)

•

2010 Qatar creates a Women’s National Team (Goldblatt, 2019)

•

2012 QSI purchases PSG

•

2012 Qatar established a domestic women’s football league (Griffin, 2019)

•

2014 Qatar Airways begins to sponsor FIFA World Cup, previously Emirates Airlines was the aviation partner

•

2017 Amid the Saudi organised embargo, Qatar runs a campaign to end the boycott using famous footballers; Xavi, Iker Casillas and the De Boer twins all participated. (Goldblatt, 2019)

•

2019 and 2020 Qatar hosts the FIFA Club World Cup

•

2019 Qatar wins the Asian Cup in the UAE, beating both Saudi Arabia and the
UAE on-route to the final.

•

2022 Qatar hosts the FIFA World Cup
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UAE involvement in Football
•

1974 UAE becomes FIFA member nation

•

1977 Famous Leeds United and England manager Don Revie is appointed as coach
of the national team. His contract is for 4 years and £340,000 per year. His wage
as the England national team coach was a relatively measly £25,000 per year. This
appointment stuns the English public and offends the FA, leading them to suspend
him for ten years for bringing the game into disrepute (Thani and Heenan, 2016).
In the decades since, famous European coaches Roy Hodgson, Henri Michel, Dick
Advocaat and Carlos Queiros have all coached the UAE national team.

•

1990 The National Team qualifies for its first FIFA World Cup

•

2002 Emirates Airlines begins sponsorship of the AFC

•

2004 Emirate Airlines secures the naming rights to the new Arsenal FC stadium in
London for £90 million.

•

2007 Sheikh Mohammed Al Maktoum of Dubai tries to purchase Liverpool FC
(Montague, 2017)

•

2007 UAE hosts and wins the Gulf Cup, sparking enthusiasm around the sport and
the single largest public gathering since the nation was founded.

•

2008 The football league in the UAE is relaunched

•

2008 Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan purchases Manchester City Football
Club

•

2009 UAE hosts the FIFA Club World Cup in, and again in 2010, 2017, 2018 and
2021

•

2010 UAE creates a Women’s National Team (Goldbaltt, 2019)

•

2011 Etihad Airways begins a ten year, £400 million deal with Manchester City for
stadium naming rights and shirt sponsorship (Montague, 2017)

•

2013 Government flies female fans to Bahrain to enable them to watch the Gulf
Cup final

•

2019 UAE host the Asian Cup. Forced to allow Qatar to participate despite the ongoing political boycott of them organised by Saudi Arabia. FIFA had threatened to
expel the UAE if they did not allow Qatar in.
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Saudi Arabia involvement in Football
•

1969 The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia calls for a ban on football, saying the game
sparks trouble and hate and draws attention away from Islam (Goldblatt, 2019)

•

1970s Saudi Arabia begins to heavily invest in domestic football

•

1989 Saudi Arabia hosts and win the FIFA Youth World Cup

•

1992 Saudi Arabia hosts the first FIFA Confederations Cup, and do so again in 1995.

•

1994-2006 The national team qualifies for four successive World Cups

•

1994 The national team becomes the first Arabic team to reach the round of 16 at
the FIFA World Cup (Goldblatt, 2019)

•

2012 Prince Nawaf bin Faisal forced out as president of SAFF by the people, replaced with a commoner and advocate for women’s football – Ahmed Eid Al Harbi
(Goldblatt, 2019)

•

2016 The Council of Ministers of Saudi Arabia approves the move towards privatisation of the Saudi Premier League (SPL)

•

2017–2021 Saudi Arabia leads an embargo of Qatar by other MENA nations. Simultaneously, it urges FIFA to strip Qatar of its right to host the 2022 World Cup.

•

January 2018 Ban on women attending football matches is lifted

•

Feb 2018 SAFF agree ten-year US$1.76 billion deal with Saudi Telecomm Company to broadcast the SPL (Bainbridge and Moroney, 2018)

•

2018 Saudi Arabia pirate’s the BeIN Sports (Qatar) feed of the FIFA World Cup,
providing it free to its national audience

•

2019 and 2020 Regional women’s leagues are established around the country

•

2019 Department of Women’s Football Development set up, centred on creating a
new national league and expanding the growth of the women’s game.

•

2021 Saudi Arabia establishes a national women’s league. 16 teams participate and
Al- Mamlaka wins the inaugural title.

•

2022 A women’s national team is also set up and focus is put on developing female
coaches and referees as well (FIFA Report, 2022)

•

2022 The SAFF Website publishes Saudi Arabia’s major achievements in international football: World Cup participation – 1994 – 2006 and 2018. Asian Cup
Champion – 1984, 1988 in Qatar, 1996 in UAE. Arab Cup Champion – 1998 in
Qatar, 2002. Gulf Cup Champion – 1994 in UAE, 2002 at home, 2003.
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